USE_CASES

Where accountability infrastructure matters.
Three domains where agents act, fail, and someone pays.

01

Autonomous Financial Agents

Trading agents executing portfolio rebalancing. One agent misreads a data feed, sells $2.4M in holdings. The trade completes before anyone notices.

Logs say the agent "decided" to sell. No proof of what data it saw. No record of authorization bounds. Legal exposure: unlimited.

Warrant bounded the trade to $50K ceiling. Physics engine rejected the $2.4M attestation (exceeds constraint). Trade never sealed. Checkpoint surety rolled back to last valid state. Liability: contained, attributable, accountable.

warrant flow
warrant: { scope: 'trade:execute', ceiling: 50000 }
physics: { max_value: 50000, validated: true }
attestation: REJECTED (ceiling_exceeded)
surety: ROLLBACK to checkpoint_0x7f3a
02

Healthcare Compliance Agents

Clinical AI agents accessing patient records to generate treatment summaries. An agent pulls records for 847 patients to "improve its model." The access happens through a valid API with valid credentials.

Access logs show 847 reads. HIPAA audit asks: was each access for treatment, payment, or operations? The agent has no answer. Each unauthorized access: $50K to $1.9M penalty.

Each record access required a warrant scoped to specific patient + purpose. Physics engine validated access patterns against expected clinical workflows. 843 of 847 accesses matched warrants. 4 anomalous accesses flagged, sealed with violation attestations, auto-reported to compliance. Liability: documented, bounded, defensible.

warrant flow
warrant: { scope: 'patient:read', patient_id: 'P-4821', purpose: 'treatment_summary' }
physics: { access_pattern: 'single_patient', validated: true }
attestation: VERIFIED (scope_match)
audit: { hipaa_category: 'treatment', retention: '6_years' }
03

Infrastructure Operations Agents

Deployment agent rolling out a config change to production. The change passes staging but triggers a cascading failure across 12 services in production. Mean time to detect: 23 minutes.

Post-mortem takes 3 days. Team reconstructs timeline from scattered logs across 12 services. Blast radius unclear. Root cause attribution: inconclusive.

Warrant scoped the deployment to 2-service canary. Physics engine validated the blast radius constraint. When service 3 received changes, the attestation was rejected (scope exceeded). Surety checkpoint triggered automatic rollback. Blast radius: 2 services, 45 seconds. Incident report: auto-generated from sealed attestation chain.

warrant flow
warrant: { scope: 'deploy:canary', services: ['api-gateway', 'auth-service'], max_blast_radius: 2 }
physics: { service_count: 2, validated: true }
attestation: REJECTED at service_3 (blast_radius_exceeded)
surety: ROLLBACK to checkpoint_0x9e2b, duration: 45s
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